Judgment \u3cem\u3eNon Obstantibus Datis\u3c/em\u3e

A Review of Jury Trials by John Baldwin and Michael McConvill

The Role of Stories in Civil Jury Judgments

A brief review of psychological theories of juror decision making is followed by an introduction to explanation-based theories of judgment. Prior empirical studies of explanation-based processes in juror decision making are then reviewed. An original empirical study of jurors\u27 judgments concerning liability for punitive damages is presented to illustrate the explanation-based approach to civil decisions

What Happened on Deliberation Day?

What are the effects of deliberation about political issues? This essay reports the results of a kind of Deliberation Day, involving sixty-three citizens in Colorado. Groups from Boulder, a predominantly liberal city, met and discussed global warming, affirmative action, and civil unions for same-sex couples; groups from Colorado Springs, a predominately conservative city, met to discuss the same issues. The major effect of deliberation was to make group members more extreme than they were when they started to talk. Liberals became more liberal on all three issues; conservatives became more conservative. As a result, the division between the citizens of Boulder and the citizens of Colorado Springs were significantly increased as a result of intragroup deliberation. Deliberation also increased consensus, and dampened diversity, within the groups. Hence Deliberation Day produced group polarization, in the distinctive form of ideological amplification. Implications are explored for the uses and structure of deliberation in general.

Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics.group decision making under uncertainty, free-rider problem, majority-plurality rules, marginally-diminishing group returns, evolutionary games, behavioral experiment

Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply to Richard Lempert

article published in law reviewRichard Lempert, a Professor of Law and Sociology at the University of Michigan criticized our recent article on judge and jury performance of a punitive damage judgment task, calling it a "failure of a social science case for change." Professor Lempert's depiction of our research is confusing and incorrect. However, because we believe a reading of only the Lempert critique can lead to a substantial misunderstanding of our research and its implications, we have written a reply

The influence of perceived causation on judgments of time: an integrative review and implications for decision-making

Recent research has shown that the perception of causality affects the judgment of elapsed time: an interval between an action and a subsequent event seems to be shorter when people believe that action has caused the event. This article reviews past work on the phenomenon and integrates the findings from the different settings in which it has been observed. The effect is found for actions people have personally taken, as well as for those they have simply read or heard about. It occurs for very short intervals (e.g., milliseconds) as well as longer periods (e.g., months or years). Beliefs and expectations about different types of causal forces and their trajectories over time can affect the degree of time compression in some settings. But the tendency toward compression of time is the default and dominant response: It persists when people think of generic causal relations and is enhanced when people opt for the quickest interpretation of causal relations. This robust influence of causality on time judgment appears to be linked to the basic tendency to rely on temporal proximity in processing causal relations and to people's early experience with the physical-mechanical world. Past work has focused primarily on the implications of time compression for the sense of agency, but this phenomenon has implications also for decisions that depend on time judgment. The compression of subjective time elapsed between actions and outcomes makes people more optimistically plan the timing of a focal action in the future, experience its effect earlier in the future, and be less likely to switch to an alternative course of action. The tendency toward compression can thus endow an action with a sort of privileged status or advantage

Effects of Amount of Information on Overconfidence

Title: Effects of amount of information on overconfidenceAuthors: Tsai, Claire; Klayman, Joshua; Hastie, ReidAffiliation: The University of ChicagoAbstract: When a person makes a judgment based on evidence and assesses confidence in that judgment, what is the effect of providing more judgment-relevant information? Findings by Oskamp (1965) and by Slovic and Corrigan (1977) suggest that more information leads to increasing overconfidence. , We replicate the finding that receiving more information leads judges to increase their confidence even when their predictive accuracy does not improve. We identify some likely candidates for cues people use to judge confidence that do not correlate well with actual accuracy

Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics

Order in choice effects of serial position on preferences

ABSTRACT-When several choice options are sampled one at a time in a sequence and a single choice of the best option is made at the end of the sequence, which location in the sequence is chosen most often? We report a large-scale experiment that assessed tasting preferences in choice sets of two, three, four, or five wines. We found a large primacy effect-the first wine had a large advantage in the endof-sequence choice. We also found that participants who were knowledgeable about wines showed a recency effect in the longer sequences. We conclude with a process model that explains our findings

Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics